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MAKING MANAGED COMPETITION A SOCIAL
ARENA: STRATEGIES FOR ACTION
Louise G. Trubek*
INTRODUCTION
Currently, the United States is debating new systems of
health care financing and delivery. This process may result in
an unexpected social policy success: universal coverage. But
universal coverage may be paired with a strange new managed
competition structure. This scenario prompts the question: will
universal coverage come at too high a cost?
In the last decade, Wisconsin has previewed two managed
competition programs. Advocates, government administrators
and providers have adapted surprisingly well and have made
managed competition an ongoing process that gives consumers
a voice. More particularly, mechanisms have been invented
and utilized to adjust and modify the new system to local con-
ditions. Although the programs are new, and admittedly con-
tain many flaws, the Wisconsin experience may be worth emu-
lating.'
This Article has a two-part theme. After briefly explaining
managed competition, it describes the experience of Wisconsin
advocates who strive to obtain quality health care for their
* Clinical Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School. I would like
to express my appreciation for the able research and editorial assistance of
Elizabeth Hoffmann. I would like to thank Neva Kaye, Section Chief of the
Managed Care Section, Ruth Belshaw, Unit Chief of the Managed Care Operations
Unit, each at the Bureau of Health Care Financing, and Tom Korpady, Director of
Health and Disability Benefits at the Department of Employee Trust Funds for
their helpful comments on this Article. I also would like to thank Shirin Cabraal
of Legal Action of Wisconsin, Nur Jawar and Lisa Monagale of HealthWatch, and
Mark Bengry, Manager of Member Services at the Department of Employee Trust
Funds for their cooperation in providing information. Errors and opinions
expressed in this Article are my own.
1 I have been a lawyer for disadvantaged consumers in the health care system
for nearly twenty years. This Article reflects some of my own practice, writing and
teaching.
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clients within Wisconsin's new managed competition structure.
The Article then discusses how national and state legislation
and institutional development can encourage advocacy based
on the lessons learned from that experience. Now is the time
for us to reflect on how to train, compensate and coordinate
advocates for quality health care and to consider new strate-
gies and institutions which will protect consumers and allow
for their participation.
I. MANAGED COMPETITION AND CONSUMER CONCERNS
Managed competition is "a purchasing strategy to obtain
maximum value for money."2 Its main goal is to divide provid-
ers into competing economic units so that market forces will
encourage them to develop more efficient delivery systems.
This strategy, as proposed by Professor Alain C. Enthoven,
uses concepts of competition borrowed from theories of rational
microeconomics. It "reward[s] with more subscribers and reve-
nue those health plans that do the best job of improving quali-
ty, cutting cost, and satisfying patients," without segmenting
the market, covering only low-risk patients, or circumventing
the goals of managed competition in other ways.3
Like all forms of market competition for health care, the
basic goal of organizational competition is to achieve maximum
efficiency.' "Efficiency" is generally defined in two ways: (1)
efficiency in the use of health services, i.e., providing only
services whose demonstrated health benefits exceed their costs;
and (2) efficiency in the delivery of health services, i.e., provid-
ing even cost-efficient health services in the most efficient
manner and setting.5
To increase efficiency in the use and delivery of health
care, the organizational competition model relies on "alterna-
' Alain C. Enthoven, The History and Principles of Managed Competition, 12
HEALTH AFF. 24, 29 (Supp. 1993).
' Id. The managed competition model proposed by the Clinton Administration,
the Health Security Act, H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), S. 1757, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), is an organizational competition approach similar to that
proposed by Professor Enthoven and discussed by Rand Rosenblatt in his article
Health Care, Markets, and Democratic Values, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1067 (1981).
Rosenblatt, supra note 3, at 1078.
Rosenblatt, supra note 3, at 1078.
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rive delivery systems." These systems consist of prepaid plans
that deliver relatively comprehensive health care to the en-
rolled populations. They provide sufficient economic incentive
to other suppliers to keep costs down and presumably have
"more capacity and willingness to do so through increased
efficiency."6
Adopting this organizational competition model offers con-
sumers a choice among competing health and insurance plans.
To achieve what Enthoven labels "socially desirable
competition," all health care plans have to meet government-
established criteria.7 The criteria include community rating of
premiums and open-enrollment, which are considered neces-
sary to ensure access for "high-risk" patients, such as the el-
derly, the poor and the chronically ill.
Governmental monitoring of the open-enrollment practices
is essential to guarantee that all health plans are competing to
provide high-quality comprehensive health care at a reasonable
cost, without profiting by practices such as preferred-risk selec-
tion, limiting enrollment to the healthy, or selling inadequate
coverage.' Clearly, in any market approach where there is a
concentration of economic power, there is also a need for care-
fully designed mechanisms for consumer protection and social
regulation.'
Even with such mechanisms, advocates and scholars have
questioned whether a managed competition model will ade-
quately serve consumers who may have difficulty asserting
their claims. The anticipated difficulties include:
underutilization of medical services due to the financial incen-
tives of capitation payments, a limited number of providers in
each managed care system, and the reliance on the "informed
consumer" to make choices of plans."
In addition to these reservations, the work of Rand
Rosenblatt outlines his belief that market models are by na-
6 Rosenblatt, supra note 3, at 1086.
7 Rosenblatt, supra note 3, at 1077.
8 Rosenblatt, supra note 3, at 1077.
Rosenblatt, supra note 3, at 1088.
10 Alan L. Hillman et al., Safeguarding Quality in Managed Competition, 12
HEALTH AFF. 116 (Supp. 1993); Rand E. Rosenblatt, Medicaid Primary Care Case
Management, the Doctor-Patient Relationship, and the Politics of Privatization, 36
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 915, 919 (1986).
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ture necessarily individualistic and counter to group processes
and values." He states that "the market approach conceives
health care choices to be a highly individual matter, which
separates the already fragmented individual from the rest of
society and makes conscious social choices even more difficult
than they are presently."2 Professor Rosenblatt suggests an-
other perspective which recognizes the limits of the existing
fee-for-service system and market models and attempts to
build a democratic social process able to make decisions about
health care delivery.13
Although Professor Rosenblatt's critique of the market
model presents issues of genuine concern about consumer pow-
er under the Clinton bill, this Article uses the Wisconsin model
to demonstrate how aspects of the market model can in fact
produce the "democratic social process" that will lead to posi-
tive community-based and individual decisions about health
care. Indeed, the experience in Wisconsin demonstrates the
potential to overcome the problems raised by the critics.
II. THE WISCONSIN EXPERIENCE
Over the past decade, during which Wisconsin encouraged
the formation of Health Maintenance Organizations ("HMOs")
through a state policy initiative, managed care initiatives have
caused difficulties. The financial incentives to maximize pro-
vider income at the expense of medically necessary services
resulted in underserving some consumers. The availability of
and payment for certain types of services, especially prenatal,
obstetric and gynecological, as well as alcohol and drug abuse
and mental health services, diminished. Consumers experi-
enced difficulties in accessing and understanding the new
managed care system. Comparative and usable information
was scarce. Surprisingly, however, the government
management and social participation suggested by Professor
Rosenblatt did develop. Moreover, the HMOs themselves have
realized that consumer participation and protection can assist
them in creating a cost-effective and quality product.
1 See Rosenblatt, supra note 3, at 1068.
12 Rosenblatt, supra note 3, at 1068.
13 Rosenblatt, supra note 3, at 1069.
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The process of modifying the managed competition model
was significantly influenced by advocates and client groups.
When they observed the negative effects of managed competi-
tion, the Wisconsin advocates realized the necessity for partici-
pation and protection, and began working with clients and
client groups. From the observations and experiences gathered
from these meetings, the advocates developed mechanisms for
accountability and regulation that have responded to the mar-
ket failures of the past decade. None of the mechanisms are
completely successful; all are "works in progress." 4 These par-
ticular techniques involve group processes that include advo-
cates, clients and client groups, providers and government
regulators. They have resulted in increased government over-
sight, participation by the community, advocates and clients,
and modification of provider behavior. In a sense, the mecha-
nisms are a hybrid of the "organization" model proposed by
Professor Enthoven and the need for a democratic social pro-
cess expressed by Professor Rosenblatt.
A. Background
In the early 1980s, Wisconsin commenced a strategy of
cost containment through the encouragement of managed com-
petition. The initiative originated in the legislature under the
leadership of Senator Paul Offner 15 and was implemented in
three parts: the formation of a state employee plan; the regula-
tion of private sector; and the reformation of the Medicaid pro-
gram. The reform began when the Department of Employe
Trust Funds, with the guidance of the Group Insurance Board,
developed a managed care package entitled the "Dual-Choice
Plan" for all state employees. This plan provided state employ-
ees with financial incentives to enroll in HMOs instead of fee-
for-service systems. 6 Next, the legislature promulgated
"4 For discussion of the mechanisms-participating in the bid process, coordi-
nating consumer complaints within the HMOs, producing information for consumer
choice, and ensuring jobs and community development-see infra section II.B.
" Senator Offner is now a top aide to Senator Daniel Moynihan and a key
player in the national health care debate.
1" Stephen C. Hill & Barbara L. Wolfe, Testing the HMO Competitive Strategy:
An Analysis of Its Success and Failure in Wisconsin 18 (Jan. 5, 1994) (on file with
author).
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changes in the insurance regulatory statutes to encourage the
private sector to use pre-paid systems."7 Finally, in 1984, the
State Medicaid Bureau requested and received a waiver from
the federal government to experiment with a mandatory man-
aged care program for Medicaid recipients. The program ap-
plies almost exclusively to AFDC recipients and is located
primarily in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. 8 The three-part initiative
has enrolled successfully a high percentage of Wisconsin citi-
zens in managed care systems. Figures for 1992 indicate that
Wisconsin had 22.3% of the population enrolled in HMOs as
compared with the National average of 16.1%. This places Wis-
consin among the ten states with the highest HMO enroll-
ments."
The two parts of the Wisconsin initiative that resemble the
current federal managed competition proposals are the State
Employees' Dual-Choice Plan and the Medical Assistance
Health Maintenance Organization ("MA/HMO") Program.
These two programs vary in the type of choice they offer to
consumers. The MA/HMO Program is mandatory for all AFDC
recipients in Milwaukee. The recipients are given a choice,
however, in selecting from managed care alternatives." All of
the HMOs that participate in the MA/HMO program have
other enrollees through other payors. That is, none of the plans
exclusively or primarily serve Medicaid recipients. In contrast
to the AFDC recipients' mandatory participation, state employ-
ees are encouraged through financial incentives to enroll in
managed care systems. Both parts allow recipients to choose
among the managed care plans.2'
1 1983 Wis. Legis. Serv. 27 (West).
18 OFFICE OF POLaY & BUDGET, WISCONSIN DEP' OF HEALTH AND Soc. SERV.,
AN EVALUATION OF THE MEDICAID HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION PROGRAM:
1989-91 (1992). In 1994, there will be a pilot managed care project for the dis-
abled enrolled in Medical Assistance. In addition, a primary care gatekeeper pro-
ject will be implemented for AFDC recipients in several counties outside of Mil-
waukee.
1 GROUP HEALTH ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, 1993 NATIONAL DIRECTORY OF
HMOs 14 (1993).
"' Some categories of AFDC recipients in Milwaukee are exempted from the
managed care requirement. For example, women in their third trimester of preg-
nancy can opt out of HMO enrollment, as can HIV-positive individuals who need
anti-retroviral drug treatment. See 1994 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL
SERVICES, CONTRACT FOR SERVICES BETWEEN DEPT OF HEALTH & SOC. SERV. AND
HMO 40 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 CONTRACT].
21 GROUP INSURANCE BOARD, GUIDELINES FOR COMPREHENSIVE MEDICAL PLANS
[Vol. 60: 275
STRATEGIES FOR ACTION
When the two programs were instigated there was consid-
erable confusion and dissatisfaction. The programs began a
quick, rapid transformation of the health care system. In Mil-
waukee, the Medicaid-managed care system, which eventually
included nearly 125,000 people,22 had a tremendous effect on
health care and the availability of providers in the central city.
In Madison, where the State Employees' Dual-Choice Plan had
the greatest impact, there was a major reorganization of the
health care delivery system.23 These transformations resulted
in anticipated problems for consumers: limited access, diffi-
culty in obtaining services, and confusion in understanding
new procedures.
B. Mechanisms for Consumer Protection and Participation
In response to these rapid and major transformations,
advocates for consumers and poor people experimented with
various strategies to provide protection and participation for
their clients. Over the past ten years, advocates have conceptu-
alized and implemented four mechanisms for protection and
participation to ameliorate the difficulties for enrollees in a
managed care system. These adaptations emerged in both the
MA/HMO and the State Employees' Dual-Choice Plan. The
mechanisms provide for participation in the bid process, coordi-
nating consumer complaints within the HMO, producing infor-
mation for consumer choice, and ensuring jobs and community
development. The mechanisms may be characterized as orga-
nized group actions. While often triggered by individual com-
plaints about health care, they amplify consumer concerns into
system-wide issues and help develop solutions. They can be
distinguished from traditional individual claims handling sys-
SEEKING GROUP INSURANCE BOARD APPROVAL TO PARTICIPATE UNDER THE STATE OF
WISCONSIN GROUP HEALTH BENEFIT PROGRAM (1993) [hereinafter GUIDELINES].
2 OFFICE OF THE COMM'R OF INS., CONSUMER'S GUIDE TO PREPAID HEALTH
PLANS IN STATE OF WISCONSIN 16 (1992).
' Hill & Wolfe, supra note 16, at 18-19. The impact included: consolidation of
health care providers in larger units, such as reducing the number of single physi-
cian offices; a merger between two hospitals, thereby reducing "the number from
four to three; one hospital turned into a non-profit hospital from a municipal one;
and many small doctors offices merged with HMOs, resulting in an increase in
multi-group and family practice doctors (from 17% in 1983 to 20% in 1990) and a
decrease in single and specialty doctors.
1994]
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tems, such as grievance procedures and law suits utilizing
court processes.
1. Participating in the Bid Process
Prior to the initiation of the MAJHMO Program, most of
the control over the Medicaid program was carried out through
an administrative agency rule-making process. In Wisconsin,
this process was subject to statutory provisions that included
legislative review and mandatory input from the public.24
When the HMO program was initiated, administrative control
was exercised through a contract model. In the move from
rule-making to contract, the methods for input by advocates for
the Medicaid recipients shifted.
The crucial step for advocate input became the contract
bidding process. All aspects of the program were addressed
through the bidding process and subsequent individual con-
tracts with HMOs. The request for bids consisted of federal
and state requirements, as well as specifications concerning
organizational, financial, access and quality issues. Because
negotiations with the HMOs involved a purchasing contract,
the public initially was thought to be excluded from participa-
tion. The bids, however, were public documents that had to
comply with specifications from the Department of Health and
Social Services ("the Department"), federal Medicaid rules, and
the stipulations of the waiver that had been granted for the
program.
Quality and access issues became recurring problems for
health care advocates under the new system. These problems
concerned mental health services, alcohol and drug abuse
treatment, quality ob/gyn care, grievance procedures and us-
able consumer information. To correct quality and access
issues, the activists presented well-documented reports to the
Department about incidents and suggested changes in HMO
procedures and practices.25 In addition, the advocates formed
24 See generally WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 641.02-.25 (West 1980).
' Interview by Elizabeth Hoffmann with Shirin Cabraal, attorney, Legal Action
(Nov. 17, 1993); interview by Elizabeth Hoffmann with Lisa Monagale, representa-
tive of HealthWatch (Nov. 17, 1993). One example is the provision of adequate
mental health services. As a result of documented complaints about the availability
of mental health services presented by the activists, the State conducted three
[Vol. 60: 275
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an ad hoc group which began to meet regularly with the HMOs
and the Medicaid administrators. Eventually these groups
evolved into several on-going organizations and arenas for
discussion.26
Health care activists realized that once the administrators
were convinced that their concerns were legitimate, the admin-
istrators could implement the needed changes in the require-
ments contained in the Request for Bids ("RFB"). Thus, in
order for the HMOs to qualify to bid for the contracts, they
would have to address the advocates' concerns.27 For example,
the 1994 RFBs included the following requirements: 1) HMOs
must be able to communicate with a caller in the caller's lan-
guage or be liable for the cost of care; 2) HMOs must encour-
age and foster cultural competence among providers and per-
mit enrollees to choose and change providers from among the
HMO network based on cultural preference; 3) HMOs' oral
complaint logs must be made available to the public; and 4)
HMOs must involve and engage the enrollees in selecting a
provider and treatment option for mental health and alcohol
and drug abuse treatment.m These changes in the requests
for bids were a direct result of the participation by various
advocacy groups throughout the year prior to the dissemina-
tion of the bids.
Another significant change in the bid process occurred in
1991, when early discussion within the Department revealed
that there was no legal requirement for public hearings or
community participation in decisions regarding bid evaluations
and awards. Although there still is no such requirement, the
committee which evaluates the bids and selects the successful
audits of the Milwaukee Mental Health Complex and other mental health provid-
ers. Interview with Shirin Cabraal, supra.
2 See infra section II.C. for discussion of the advocacy groups and arenas that
were created. HealthWatch is an advocacy group composed of health activists.
HMO Forum is an arena where the HMOs', government agencies', and community
health groups' representatives meet to discuss issues.
' Letter from Shirin Cabraal, attorney, Legal Action, to Neva Kaye, Chief,
HMO Section Bureau of Health Care Financing (May 20, 1993); letter from Kevin
Piper, Director, Bureau of Health Care Financing, to Shirin Cabraal, attorney,
Legal Action (June 3, 1993) (on file with the Brooklyn Law Review).
28 Memorandum from Kevin B. Piper, Director, Bureau of Health Care Financ-
ing, to All Interested Parties (Oct. 1, 1993) [hereinafter Piper Memorandum] (on
file with the Brooklyn Law Review).
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bidders has included at least one advocate in each yearly re-
view.
2 9
The bid process appears to be one of the most effective
means to achieve needed changes in the HMO practices and
procedures. Because the HMOs want to remain as providers to
the Medicaid recipients, the Department is able to impose
requirements to address the concerns raised by the advocacy
groups. Interestingly, the Department has no information on
the profitability of the individual HMO contracts. However, the
number of HMOs that continue to participate in the program
indicates that they are receiving sufficient reimbursement.
The State Employees' system has not developed a similar
pattern of participation by outside groups of consumers and
advocates in the bid process. Although the state system is
quite similar to the Medicaid/HMO model in its bid process, in
the state system a board with citizen and labor union repre-
sentatives makes the decision on bids. In contrast, the Medic-
aid/HMO model program's administrators make the decisions
without any outside review.
2. Coordinating Consumer Complaints within the HMO
Originally, consumers who were dissatisfied with HMO
service had recourse both to grievance systems and to the court
system. But these systems proved insufficient to consumers,
providers and administrators, as such an individualized ap-
proach often is expensive and does not yield system-wide im-
provements. Therefore, both the Medicaid/HMO and the State
Employee systems developed methods to group consumer com-
plaints to provide both consumer redress and system-wide
input.
The Medicaid/HMO system established an HMO Advocates
Program. The HMO contract requires each IMO to provide an
advocate position, funded by the HMO. The advocates' role is
primarily one of outreach to and education of the enrollees.
Thus far, they have targeted their efforts at disseminating
information about transportation services covered by their
HMO, teaching enrollees how to use the IMO, and encour-
29 Interview with Neva Kaye, Department of Health and Human Services, in
Madison, WI (Apr. 8, 1994).
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aging the utilization of the prenatal, Healthy Start and
HealthCheck programs."
One example of an HMO advocate response to enrollee dis-
satisfaction is a program called "Dental Days." This project
cooperated with Head Start to deal with the underutilization of
dental care by recipients. The program found that Head Start
children were not able to get dental visits soon enough and,
therefore, were delayed in Head Start enrollment. The HMOs
and Head Start developed an improved dental appointment
system which has been highly successful.3 '
To coordinate its consumer complaints, the Employe Trust
Fund, in 1992, created the position of HMO ombudsman, offi-
cially entitled Manager of Member Services. 2 The ombuds-
man advocates for plan members, and attempts to resolve their
complaints and disputes with the health plans. In addition,
using information gained from individual complaints, the om-
budsman provides input on behalf of participants in contract
design, policy developments and procedures. For example, the
current ombudsman reported to the supervising board that the
member fee-for-service complaints were higher than those from
the HMO plans, on a percentage basis.3
3. Producing Information for Consumer Choice
Both Wisconsin systems-MAIHMO and the State
Employees' Dual-Choice Plan-rest their claims for combining
cost containment and quality care on consumers' ability to
change plans if they are dissatisfied. If consumers are to make
these choices, they must have good information on quality, ac-
cess and cost.
The State Employees' Dual-Choice Plan has effectively
used cost incentives to encourage employees to switch to cost-
" Minutes from HMO Community Advocates Meeting, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 1-
2 (Feb. 25, 1994) (on file with the Brooklyn Law Review).
'" Id. at 2.
32 STATE OF WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYE TRUST FUNDS, POSITION
SUMMARY: MANAGER OF MEMBER SERVICES (June 1, 1992) (on file with the Brook-
lyn Law Review).
' Memorandum from Mark Bengry, Manager of Member Services, State of
Wisconsin Department of Employe Trust Funds, to the Group Insurance Board 3
(Jan. 13, 1994) (on file with the Brooklyn Law Review).
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effective plans. Because the standard plan-a fee-for-service
system-is considerably more expensive, substantial numbers
of consumers have moved into the HMOs with significant cost
savings to the state. As of 1992, 90% of active state employees
were enrolled in an HMO, while 10% remained in the standard
plan.34 But cost is only one factor of importance to a consum-
er.
Scant consumer information on quality or satisfaction has
been available to state employees making their annual choices.
In 1992, the Group Insurance Board, which oversees the plan,
contracted with the University of Wisconsin Survey Research
Laboratory to conduct a consumer satisfaction survey, the
results of which later were presented to the Board. The survey
included questions on convenience of facilities, staff helpful-
ness, length of time to get appointments, and ability to get a
referral. There also were questions about satisfaction with
grievance procedures and usefulness of information. The sur-
vey made no attempt to discuss other quality indicators.35 The
Administrator of the Board has stated that he had no resourc-
es to obtain data on care quality. He also indicated a skepti-
cism about the reliability of data systems available for quality
determinations. In more recent conversations, he did concede
that the newest systems might be more reliable and that he is
considering implementing such systems.36 However, there is
still no consumer group or other agency providing comparative
information directly to the enrollees.
The MA/HMO Program, however, is currently collecting
quality and access information. The contracts that the HMOs
enter require the provision of quarterly utilization reports.
These reports are crucial because there is no cost incentive for
a consumer to choose a particular HMO. In 1993, the Depart-
ment gathered extensive data on comparative indicators on the
use of preventive care, such as mammograms and many surgi-
cal procedures. This data collection, due in part to the activity
of the advocacy groups, enabled quality and accessibility com-
parisons between HMOs.
Hill & Wolfe, supra note 16, at Table I.
3' Interview with Tom Korpady, Administrator, State of Wisconsin Department
of Employe Trust Funds, in Madison, WI (Nov. 18, 1993).
SG Id.
31 MANAGED CARE SECTION, BUREAU OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING, REPORTS
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The Medicaid Bureau has shared the information with
each HMO. The data is also shared with advocates and state
legislators. This method of distributing the quality-analysis
data has been effective and the administrator foresees the data
discussions leading to substantial quality improvements.38 In
addition, advocates may use the data to assist clients to make
more informed decisions when choosing among HMOs.39
Groups also could use the data to set goals for an HMO to
improve its quality of care during bid negotiations.
4. Ensuring Jobs and Community Development
The HMO initiatives have substantial effects not only on
the delivery of services to consumers but on the viability of
communities where a disproportionate number of enrollees
live. Both Wisconsin programs have instituted methods to
ensure that the economic well-being of these communities is
not negatively impacted by the large scale utilization of man-
aged care systems.
Rural communities and rural legislators expressed con-
cerns about the possible loss of accessible health care and local
jobs in health care because of the institution of the managed
competition plan. In response, the Group Insurance Board used
its participation requirements in the bid process to encourage
the maintenance of rural providers. The administrator of the
Dual-Choice Plan believes that these requirements for partici-
pation were crucial in maintaining rural service which other-
wise might have been substantially reduced. The bid require-
ments contain an addendum entitled "Providers Under Con-
tract Physically Located in Each Major City/County/Zip
Code."4" This addendum specifies rates of primary physicians
to subscribers, requires that there be at least one general hos-
pital per county or major city, assures access to pharmacies
and dentists, and provides that after being offered for a year,
the plan must achieve a minimum enrollment amount in the
service area.
(1993).
Interview with Neva Kaye, supra note 29.
" Interview with Shirin Cabraal, supra note 25.
40 GUIDELINES, supra note 21, at 43.
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The administrator believes that these requirements con-
tribute to a pattern of cooperating agreements or actual inte-
gration of the rural providers into managed care networks.
Without these requirements, he believes that the larger city-
based hospitals and clinics would have required rural clients to
use the city-based facilities for primary care, and as a result
the health-care services and jobs would have left the rural
communities. The adminstrator considers the bid requirements
to be crucial for the development of the strong presence of
competing rural clinics for rural communities that now ex-
ists.41
Ironically, while the rural health care system was adapt-
ing to the HMO initiative, health care providers were leaving
central city locations. The Milwaukee central city business
development was greatly impacted by the MA/HMO initiative.
The distribution of primary care and other providers in the
metropolitan area was substantially reduced by the MA/HMO
Program. At one time, as many as forty black physicians and
health practitioners worked in the central city. By 1993, only
seven or eight remained. In addition, few hospitals remain in
the central city areas. While it was difficult to maintain an
independent practice prior to the Medicaid initiative, most
observers believe the managed care system exacerbated this
situation.42 As a result, community groups have been outspo-
ken about the lack of cultural sensitivity and accessible provid-
ers available in the central city.
Several new approaches have been implemented to pro-
mote the health business development of the central city. The
Milwaukee Economic Development Commission began to en-
courage minority health practitioners to stay in the central city
through a combination of private philanthropic money and
bank loans.4 3 The Medicaid program has made several addi-
tions to its bid requirements aimed at aiding the location and
maintenance of such providers. In its response to the RFB,
41 Interview with Tom Korpady, supra note 35.
42 See, e.g., Marilynn Marchione, Physicians Get a Healthy Boost With Economic
Development Loans, MILWAUKEE J., Oct. 19, 1993, at B1; Paul W. Nannis, Mater-
nal and Child Health in the Cities: A Local Perspective 3 (Sept. 15, 1992) (Ad-
dress at CityMatCH in Washington, D.C.) (transcript on file with the Brooklyn
Law Review).
' Marchione, supra note 42, at B1.
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each bid must identify all minority business enterprises that it
proposes to utilize in the performance of the contract activities.
Those bidders who are unsuccessful in securing a subcontract-
ing agreement with a minority business enterprise must pro-
vide in their response a description of the nature and scope of
the efforts expended to do so."
Another section of the RFB specifically relates to mental
health and alcohol and drug abuse treatment providers for
minority communities. Attached to the RFB is a listing, by zip
code, of the minority providers. The RFB states: "The Depart-
ment strongly encourages all contracting HMOs to contract
with community providers that are culturally relevant, sensi-
tive and in close geographic proximity to the recipient commu-
nity.
45
Both the State Employees' Dual-Choice Plan and MA/HMO
contracts contain affirmative action requirements, including
the maintenance of plans to be made available to regulators. 6
Although advocacy groups have paid little attention to these
plans, these documents could be sources of valuable informa-
tion for groups wishing to encourage job development in low-
income communities.
C. Analysis of the Wisconsin Advocacy
The description of the mechanisms that developed in Wis-
consin provides a basis for examining possible methods of ad-
vocacy for the beneficiaries. There are three entities that pro-
vide some insight into how and why the voices of consumers
are heard: client groups, advocates and arenas. The interrela-
tionship between these three entities is responsible for the
development of protection and participation mechanisms.
1. The Client Groups
The two principal groups in need of advocates to speak on
their behalf-the AFDC population, which was the target for
Piper Memorandum, supra note 28, at 31.
' Piper Memorandum, supra note 28, at 14.
'6 1994 CONTRACT, supra note 20, at 16; see also GUIDELINES, supra note 21, at
19941
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the HMO initiative, and the state employees-are distinctly
different from one another. Medicaid recipients in Milwaukee
have poor health statistics. 7 They also reside in central city
neighborhoods within the City of Milwaukee. AFDC recipients
are primarily young women with children, clients of the wel-
fare system who live in contiguous communities. Medicaid
recipients as a group traditionally have been considered to
require protection because of their dependency on government
programs.
In contrast, state employees are based primarily in small
cities and rural counties. The beneficiaries are heterogeneous
in age and gender. Although many are represented by labor
unions, the employees who are not members of unions resem-
ble unorganized consumers who require protection because of
their large numbers and inability to organize into groups."8
All consumers require usable information, monitoring of
quality and protection against inefficient cost-containment.
Both the Medicaid beneficiaries and the state employees re-
quire assistance handling the managed care and managed
competition approaches. Moreover, without protection of and
participation by these consumers, the health-care system will
not function efficiently and equitably. Client group in-
volvement must exist in both governmental oversight and
within the provider plans.
2. The Advocates
The advocates who have been active in Milwaukee in the
MA/HMO program include groups that were active prior to the
initiation of the program, as well as newly organized agencies
that formed in response to the program. Legal Action of Wis-
consin, funded by the Legal Services Corporation, had an exist-
ing health unit which was able to respond when the initiative
was announced. The Center for Public Representation ("CPR"),
a public interest law firm based in Madison, also had a long-
standing interest in health issues and was actively involved in
47 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., HEALTHIER PEOPLE IN WISCON-
SIN: A PUBLIC HEALTH AGENDA FOR THE YEAR 2000 (Oct. 26, 1993).
48 See generally Burton A. weisbrod, Introduction to PUBLIC INTEREST LAW: AN
ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 1-3 (Burton A. Weisbrod et al., eds., 1978)
[hereinafter PUBLIC INTEREST LAW].
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all aspects of the state legislative move toward encouraging'
managed care. In the early years of the initiative, each group
provided one attorney and several law students to advocate on
HMO issues.
HealthWatch, a coalition of community groups, health
professionals and advocacy groups,49 arose directly from com-
munity concerns about the effects on the Milwaukee communi-
ty from the implementation of the HMO system. Its declared
mission is "to advocate for Milwaukee County Medicaid recip-
ients as it relates to access and quality of health care servic-
es .... [To] facilitate communication among groups affected by
the Medicaid HMO program, identify areas of concern regard-
ing access to health care services, participate in problem solv-
ing activities to identified issues, and offer policy changes to
the Department of Health and Human Services."0
Another active player in the HlIMO interactions is the
Black Health Coalition, "a group of local organizations and
individuals whose collaborative goal is to address the health
problems of African Americans."5 The Black Health Coalition
started as a small group with scant funding in response to
general concern about the situation of blacks in the Milwaukee
community. Its mission is to "improve the health status of
African Americans in the State of Wisconsin and to insure
equitable and comprehensive health for all people."52 Indeed,
through its visibility, it has greatly assisted with job and busi-
ness development issues, both widespread concerns in the
black community. Additionally, the Coalition has worked ex-
tensively with the minority health care providers and has
successfully emphasized the relationship between effective
health care and the presence of minority providers.
In addition to these groups, the Commissioner of Health
for Milwaukee, Paul Nannis, views himself as an advocate for
health in the community and has played that role with great
dedication. His support on the issues of diversity in the staff-
ing of the health care system assisted in establishing the link
"9 HEALTHWATCH, 1994 MISSION, GOALS, OBJECTIVES: MISSION STATEMENT
(1994) (on file with the Brooklyn Law Review).
50 Id.
51 THE BLACK HEALTH COALITION OF WISCONSIN, FOCUSING ON THE HIGHEST
QUALITY OF LIFE FOR AFRICAN AMERICANS (on file with the Brooklyn Law Review).
62 Id.
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between the community providers and quality health care. He
also used his position to persuade the business and banking
communities to provide financial support for alternative pro-
viders.53
As to the State Employees' Dual-Choice Plan, initially the
CPR advocated for adequate grievance procedures and usable
consumer information when the program was first implement-
ed. The CPR supported managed care as a cost-effective and
quality alternative if, and only if, adequate consumer protec-
tion and participation were integrated into the program. Due
to funding limitations, however, the CPR's level of activity
diminished. Subsequently, no group has taken on a consumer
voice in that system. Thus, only two voices remain to advocate
for the state employees' health care concerns and to effect
health policies in the state employee sector: unions and the
members of the Group Insurance Board.
3. The Arenas
The literature on representation of unorganized groups
contains an extensive discussion of the most effective arenas,
or locations where advocates may pursue their activities. The
choice of location often revolves around legislative versus ad-
ministrative agencies, or state level versus national level. 4
The Wisconsin experience provides some guidance for selecting
the best forum. At the time of the plan's implementation the
Legislature seemed overwhelmed by the complexity and unim-
pressed by the importance of the constituency. Moreover, the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services continued to
give waivers for the MA/HMO initiative, despite early com-
plaints, and was committed to managed care primarily as a
cost-savings approach. An effective arena for the MA/HMO
beneficiaries was the state administrative agency that admin-
istered the program. Without the responsiveness of those ad-
ministrative personnel, the effectiveness of the advocates
would have been limited. The HMOs would have ignored the
complaints about mental health treatment, emergency care
and inadequate information.
" Marchione, supra note 42, at B1.
4 See generally PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, supra note 48, at 151-470.
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In addition to the responsive agency, new "community
arenas" developed in Milwaukee. The HMO Forum, a group of
providers, regulators and community group representatives,
meets on a regular basis. At the meetings, a membership of
close to forty people raise and discuss various issues concern-
ing HMOs.5" For example, the comparative data on the quali-
ty indicators produced by the Department of Health and Social
Services was discussed at the Forum. Also, HealthWatch regu-
larly invites representatives from a particular HMO to their
meetings to discuss problems that they perceive in that HMO.
The creation of these community arenas, where providers and
regulators meet frequently with advocates, combines communi-
ty organizing and quasi-public participation.56 Although the
community arena is "in the shadow" of the regulatory struc-
ture, it may prove an influential private/public arena.
The primary arena for the State Employees' Dual-Choice
Plan is the Group Insurance Board. The Board is a governing
body whose members are appointed by the Governor, with
interest group representation as one criterion.57 Because the
Board oversees other insurance benefit plans as well, its man-
date is extremely broad. The state employees' unions are well-
organized and participate in the Board's activities. Thus, this
constituency may be able to communicate effectively their com-
plaints directly to the Board, unions and the legislature. In
addition, the administrator of the Health Insurance Program of
the Board has indicated that, because state employees number
in the thousands, their concerns are expressed and no addi-
tional advocacy is needed." The recent institution of an om-
budsman position at the Department, however, may indicate
that the Board realizes that additional input from consumers
is required. 9 This position handles complaints and provides
input to the Board and also has assisted in the increased pro-
duction of data about consumer satisfaction. Recent discussions
of expanding the enrollees to the private sector may produce
some reassessment of the Board's effectiveness in providing
"' MILWAUKEE HMO FORUM, HMO FORUM MAILING LIST: SUMMARY MEETING
NOTES (May 12, 1992) (on file with the Brooklyn Law Review).
"6 Interview with Lisa Monagale, supra note 25.
17 WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK (1993-94).
'8 Interview with Tom Korpady, supra note 35.
5' See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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sufficient protection and participation for consumers.
III. ENABLING PROTECTION AND PARTICIPATION
Major national legislation on health care, with the accom-
panying state legislation and market reorganization, will begin
a period of ferment. During this period, opportunities exist to
assist in creating group action on behalf of the poor and other
disadvantaged groups within the managed competition ap-
proach." The Wisconsin experience may serve to guide others
in constructing a package to assist consumers to participate
effectively in health care decisions.
Public actions can substantially influence and assist the
effective expression of social concerns. For example, in the
1960s and 1970s, consumer movements and public interest
groups developed theories and programs for consumer protec-
tion and participation.6 1 This literature demonstrated that
federal and state legislation, funding from private foundations
and the government, educational innovations, and strategic
planning can be crucial in creating the conditions for social
processes. A range of strategies for accomplishing social actions
can be constructed by looking to the Wisconsin experience, as
well as scholarship and models from an earlier epoch. This
package requires developing new institutions, encouraging
representation of disadvantaged groups, writing statutory
language and training advocates.
A. Developing New Institutions
Three institutions that developed in Wisconsin are worth a
close look during the developmental stage of a model health
care plan: the community forum, the link between health care
and community development and the consumer report card.
The community forum, where providers, advocates and regula-
A project to develop criterion to evaluate national health proposals on the
basis of their potential to assist social action on behalf disadvantaged groups was
proposed by Professor Rand E. Rosenblatt in 1993. Rand E. Rosenblatt, The
Courts, Health Care Reform, and the Reconstruction of American Social Legislation,
18 J. HEALTH POL. POLVY & L. 439, 471 (1993).
1 See generally Arthur Snow & Burton A. Weisbrod, Consumerism, Consumers
and Public Interest Law, in PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, supra note 48, at 395-445.
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tors meet together to discuss consumer complaints, provider
difficulties, and regulatory issues, are institutions that should
be encouraged. They offer an informal place for communication
and strategizing. Financial support for community forums can
come from providers, charitable foundations and government
agencies. Coalitions formed by businesses, providers, and gov-
ernment, important elements in the managed competition
model, must also include the consumer voice. Legislation and
financial incentives may be needed to ensure that these
"community arenas" flourish and include all voices.
The link between the financing and delivery of health care
and community development is another key finding. The reor-
ganization of the market that results from managed competi-
tion reveals the connection between the provision of service,
the economic units and the financial well-being of the commu-
nity." The health care sector is a potential source of jobs and
income to a community, and managed competition will sub-
stantially change that configuration. Community economic
development agencies and regulatory bodies should be aware of
this connection and should seek to use the changes to strength-
en economically depressed or underserved neighborhoods and
regions.
A critical problem is the inadequate production of usable
consumer information. Medicaid recipients need simple, easy-
to-use information as well as comparative information. In Wis-
consin, state employees were provided with understandable
information, but were not provided with comparative informa-
tion. The current system, even with traditional advocates in
place, will require new methods of producing and distributing
consumer information. The current actors in the market will
not provide this information unless given additional incentives.
The administrators are too timid and the advocates are not
sufficiently organized to produce and distribute this type of
information.
The provision of usable comparative consumer information
has been barely initiated in Wisconsin. Although both the
Medicaid and state employees' programs have started to gather
data, they are just beginning to distribute the information.
Recently, both programs began to consider how to gather and
2 Hill & Wolfe, supra note 16, at 3.
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distribute the information more effectively. The success of the
Medicaid experience using data to improve quality may indi-
cate that significant attention should be given to funding and
developing quality data information programs.63
Information provided to consumers has been identified as
a traditional weakness in the market system.6 New institu-
tions will have to be developed to obtain and supply this infor-
mation. For example, the federal government might give
grants to assist in starting up state-based consumer informa-
tion publishers. Also, there has been talk of "consumer report
cards" which would assist consumers in selecting their provid-
ers. The institutions that produce these "report cards" could be
linked to advocates or could be placed in universities or non-
profit community groups.
B. Representing Disadvantaged Groups
Wisconsin utilizes two of the many models for incorporat-
ing group representation of the poor and disadvantaged con-
sumers:65 representation of consumers on the decisionmaking
board and grass roots activism."
The Group Insurance Board includes both union represen-
tatives and recipients. The Board originally took a narrow view
' A two day conference representing consumers, local purchasers, state health
data and quality assurance communities was held in Washington, D.C. The confer-
ence focused its attention on how information is "collected, analyzed, and used to
advance the health reform goals of informed consumer choice, value purchasing,
performance measurement and quality improvements." Building Blocks of Health
Reform: Health Information and Quality Assessment 1 (May 12-13, 1994) (on file
with author). In recent months, the activity of business, provider and consumer
groups in encouraging more consumer information is visible.
" Shoshanna Sofaer, Informing and Protecting Consumers under Managed Com-
petition, 12 HEALTH AFF. 76 (1993); see also Snow & Weisbrod, supra note 63, at
401-06. Consumer Reports is the only successful example of an attempt to provide
this information. Such magazines cannot function for local-level services since the
financing of the Report depends on a sufficiently large market so that it can sup-
port itself through subscriptions.
" See generally Snow & Weisbrod, supra note 61; see also David M. Trubek,
Public Advocacy, Administrative Government and the Representation of Diffuse
Interests, in 3 ACCESS TO JUSTICE: EMERGING ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES 445
(Mauro Capelletti & Bryant Garth eds., 1979).
" Louise G. Trubek et al., The Executive Order on Consumer Affairs Pro-
grams: New Voice for "Consumers" in Federal Agencies? 6 (July 2, 1980) (unpub-
lished manuscript on file with the Brooklyn Law Review).
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of its role and employed little innovation. Two recent events,
however, may demonstrate a renewed interest by the Board in
improving and expanding the State Employees' Dual-Choice
Plan. The consumer satisfaction survey discussed earlier may
indicate that the Board realizes that it must actively monitor
the health plan as part of its oversight and regulatory func-
tion. 7 Also, the recent legislative proposals to expand the
state employee system to allow private employees to enroll is a
promising development." In effect, the State Employees'
Dual-Choice Plan could become the health alliance for the
state. If the health plan expands, the Board would be required
to rethink how to include other interests in its deliberations.
The Medicaid experience is an example of how grass-roots
activism can drastically impact a bureaucratic system. Initial-
ly, no program existed to include recipients in the new man-
aged care system. But a dynamic and innovative group of advo-
cates discovered ways to become part of the process. They
accomplished this without financial assistance from the health
care system or any officially recognized position.
Even with these improvements, however, neither Wiscon-
sin program adequately represents the consumer voice. The
Board model relies too heavily on individual political appoint-
ees and the Medicaid model depends too much on the energy of
advocates. Thus, other options or methods must be found. In
the 1970s and 1980s, there were two different approaches to
consumer participation in public policy decisionmaking, both of
which deserve serious consideration. One approach, proposed
by Ralph Nader, is the creation of a formal government agency
with the mission of representation.69 The ombudsman concept,
proposed in the Health Security Act, is a version of this gov-
' Employee Trust Funds, State Employees' Health Care Plan Survey Report #1:
The Survey Sample (1992); Employee Trust Funds, State Employees' Health Care
Plan Survey Report #2: Analysis of Frequency of Use of Medical Services (1992);
Employee Trust Funds, State Employees' Health Care Plan Survey Report #3:
Health Care Providers (1993).
" Wisconsin State Assembly Bill #AB1160, 1992-93 Legislative Session. This
plan failed at the end of the 1993 legislative session, but may be revived as the
national plan evolves or when the State legislature returns for the 1994 legislative
session.
"' Walter A. Zelman, Who Should Govern the Purchasing Cooperatives?, 12
HEALTH AFF. 49 (1993). See also Snow & Weisbrod, supra note 61, at 395, 406.
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ernment advocate model.7" A group of law professors, who
testified before Congress on the Clinton Plan, have proposed
expanding the ombudsman role. This expansion would include
using consumer complaints to identify systemic problems and
assisting community groups in participating in the health care
system.7
The second proposal requires outside advocate representa-
tion on governing bodies funded by the state.72 The governing
bodies, whether alliances or state agencies, must include for-
mally appointed representatives of the poor and other disad-
vantaged groups. In addition, this approach must emphasize
that there be a companion program to support, encourage and
fund groups to participate in the decisionmaldng process. Legal
service offices, minority groups, consumer activists and small
business groups should be able to apply for these ongoing
funds. In Wisconsin and Michigan, utility advocacy programs
have versions of "citizen intervention programs" which have
experimented successfully with this model.73
C. Writing Statutory Language
In Wisconsin, the ability of the Medicaid activists to par-
ticipate in the actions of the HMOs was related directly to
their access to the bid process at the state agency level. Cur-
rent Medicaid statutes contain little to ensure that such a
process will continue in the managed competition model. This
process is particularly crucial because it is anticipated that the
Medicaid program will be folded into new managed competition
pools.
The enabling statutes at both the state and federal level
70 See HSA §§ 1300-1397.
71 Rand E. Rosenblatt, On Access to Justice, Discrimination, and Health Care
Reform 14 (Jan. 31, 1994) (testimony before the Subcomm. on Health and Env't of
the Comm. on Energy and Commerce) (rev'd text for the record, Feb. 14, 1994) (on
file with the Brooklyn Law Review).
72 See generally Louise G. Trubek & David M. Trubek, Civic Justice Through
Civil Justice: A New Approach to Public Interest Advocacy in the United States, in
MAURo CAPPELLETrI, ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND THE WELFARE STATE 119 (1981); see
also Jack H. Nagel, Combining Deliberation and Fair Representation in Community
Health Decisions, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1965 (1992).
1, WILLIAM T. GORMLEY, JR., THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATIONS
(1993).
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should include specific language to allow public inspection of
the documents in the bid process, including requests for bids
and final negotiated contracts.7 4 Moreover, specific language
to encourage input from outside groups representing the bene-
ficiaries would be helpful. The legislation also should include
incentives for the managed care systems to meet with such
groups. For example, these incentives could provide for mem-
bership on the HMOs' boards of directors or advisory commit-
tees.
Perhaps an even more radical proposal would be to emu-
late the recent Wisconsin developments that allow consumer
advocates into the bid evaluation process. Despite the fact that
there is no requirement of public participation in the Wiscon-
sin statute, the government agency has added a consumer
representative to lend legitimacy to the process.
D. Training the Advocates
The advocacy work described in this Article is not based
on the norm for most legal service, public interest and clinical
lawyering-the litigation-individual case model. Rather, the
advocacy encompasses counseling organizations, educating
clients, and lobbying legislative and administrative bodies.
This work includes data gathering and writing investigative
reports.
To provide this expanded health advocacy, law school edu-
cation should be modified and lay advocates encouraged and
trained. There are surprisingly few clinical programs or legal
service and public interest groups that work on health issues.
Perhaps with the national and state attention focused on these
issues, this is a time to encourage more activity. Law schools
are excellent areas for recruitment since health law is an ac-
tive area for law school teaching and many law schools have
developed a specialty in health law. Moreover, the approach
suggested here, with the tie to jobs and community develop-
ment, may encourage more interest in consumer-based health
law careers. 5
"' A similar proposal was urged by Professor Rosenblatt in his testimony before
the Health and Environment Subcommittee. See supra note 71, at 45-47.
"' An alternative point of view in integrating health law theory and practice is
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The challenge is to convince advocates that counseling,
legislative and administrative lobbying, and educating are
appropriate and professional methods of health care advocacy.
While this type of work is the mainstay of corporate lawyers,
the public interest and student communities continue to prefer
individual client skills and are reluctant to assume the coun-
selor and lobbyist roles. v6 In the legal service world under the
conservative Reagan and Bush administrations, this work was
often prohibited. Thus, attention must be paid to eliminating
restrictions and encouraging these activities.
There remains the challenge of training community and
health care activists to serve as lay advocates.77 Only a small
number of the activists involved in the Milwaukee HMO ac-
tions were attorneys. The others were health care providers
and community activists. The coalition of these groups and
individuals accounted for a great amount of energy. No pro-
posed program should exclude or discourage the activity of, or
job development for, lay people. In fact, every plan should
make a conscious effort to develop community organizations for
advocacy, job development and consumer information.
CONCLUSION
As we look ahead towards a redesigned health care financ-
ing and organizational system, we might also look back to the
writings and experiments of the 1960s and 1970s. The public
interest law and consumer movements reflected on how the
voices of disadvantaged groups could be heard in government
and market processes. Pioneers, like Ed Sparer, envisioned
government-funded legal services using court processes to
obtain state entitlements. In addition, these pioneers spoke out
for the planning and lobbyist roles of advocates. Scholars of the
expressed in an article by Professor David F. Chavkin. He suggests that law stu-
dents are best taught about health-law practice in a litigation-based clinic. David
F. Chavkin, Training the Ed Sparers of Tomorrow: Integrating Health Law Theory
and Practice, 60 BROOK. L. REv. 303 (1994).
" Jeffrey S. Lehman & Rochelle E. Lento, Law School Support for Community-
Based Economic Development in Low-Income Urban Neighborhoods, 42 J. URB. &
CONTEMP. L. 65 (1992); Edward V. Sparer, The Poor Man's Lawyer and Govern-
mental Agencies, in LAW AND POVERTY (1965).
" Edward V. Sparer et al., The Lay Advocate, 43 U. DET. L. REv. 493 (1966).
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consumer movement pondered alternative systems that would
enable consumer groups to effectively present their interests to
government regulators and market providers. They discussed
the market failure resulting from the absence of these concerns
in the political and economic sectors. They proposed a series of
institutional changes to facilitate the ability of these groups to
speak out. While the role of lawyers was crucial, citizen organi-
zations and consumer participation were also emphasized.78
The conservativism of the 1980s effectively silenced many
of the utopian and visionary writing and experimentation on
group action and organization for disadvantaged groups. The
maintenance of the institutions and groups that had developed
in the 1960s and 1970s preoccupied progressive scholars and
activists.
In health care, escalating costs in the 1980s resulted in a
modification of the system for health care delivery and financ-
ing. This system shifted to a new organizational structure that
reshaped the role of the state and market. The new system
will give consumer advocates an unexpected opportunity to re-
think the lawyer, client and institutional arrangements for the
participation of disadvantaged groups in the health care sys-
tem.
Recent testimony on health care reform presented before
Congress79 proposes a comprehensive system of rights and
remedies to achieve a pro-consumer system. The testimony
explains that "a great many important issues may not be
raised, or may not receive adequate attention, in a process
based solely on the initiative of individual patients."" The
testimony proposed organized consumer advocacy as an essen-
tial component of a workable health care system.8
The Wisconsin experience demonstrates the possibilities
for consumer protection and participation in managed competi-
tion. The earlier literature and experiments can provide in-
7 See PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, supra note 48; Trubek & Trubek, supra note 72.
7 Rosenblatt, supra note 71, at 43-47.
s Rosenblatt, supra note 71, at 44.
, Rosenblatt, supra note 71, at 43-47. "As currently written, the Health Secu-
rity Act does not acknowledge the role of organized consumer advocacy or explicit-
ly support its functioning." Id. at 45. Professor Rosenblatt proposed three kinds of
support for such advocacy: availability of information, access to decisionmaking
processes and funding for consumer groups. Id. at 45-46.
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sights into today's health care challenges. Looking back may
provide shards of experience that could be incorporated into
programs for the future.
